In the context of political modernization, the ideological orientation of the political elite becomes important.

But in order not to slow down this process, the elite must be open and constantly updated. Otherwise, it will decline due to bureaucracy, corruption and other phenomena. As long as economic and political development is not accompanied by certain shifts in social structure and political culture, liberal democracy cannot take place.

Political modernization, like modernization in general, encounters obstacles and pitfalls. The most common of them:

the extremes of technocracy, which ignores the social needs of society; populism, which sacrifices the effectiveness of economic development in social policy; inability or unwillingness of political power to spread the momentum of modernization from the elite to the mass level; "different degree of interest, acceptance and understanding of the modernization goal by the political elite, as well as the available potential for its implementation" [8]; shallow, mechanical perception of modern political values ​​and norms with the actual dominance of traditional political culture.

Analyzing the role of the political elite in the relationship between the state and society at the present stage, researchers note two main trends. The first tendency: under any political changes, even the most radical ones, the old elite does not completely leave the forefront, but joins the new elite, becomes part of it, or (during revolutionary upheavals) remains at political stake in the form of separate fragments.

The second trend: the new elite borrows from the old elite certain values, norms, even ideas. By the way, such borrowing can be carried out quite openly, if it is a matter of respect for national values; this process, however, can also be "smuggled" – old ideologues are used contrary to public declarations of a complete break with the past.

These tendencies can be traced in the nature of modern political development, which in Ukraine is ambivalent: modernizing and anti-modernizing at the same time. The first trend is manifested in the inclusion in the political life of social groups and individuals (in all spheres of public life created institutions of civil society), in the weakening of the traditional political elite.

According to sociological research, the level of public confidence in state and non-state structures in Ukraine is extremely low. The analysis of this tendency gave the following results: the highest degree of trust is shown to public (non-state) institutions – 0.35; representative power – 0.32; public institutions have an average trust index of 0.27; judiciary – 0.27. This may be explained by the fact that the institutions of civil society are to some extent opposed to state power, which today does not enjoy high authority [9].

The second trend is expressed in a specific form of modernization. This specificity lies in the authoritarian methods of activity and mentality of the political elite, which recognize only one-sided – top-down – direction of teams with a closed nature of decision-making. The political regime in Ukraine has proved to be a kind of hybridization based on a combination of democratic institutions, norms and values ​​with authoritarian ones.

The dynamics of transformation processes is very weak. E. Golovakha, analyzing the reasons for this, notes that, unlike the states of the "socialist camp", Ukraine has embarked on a path of democratic transformation, initiated and implemented by representatives of the provincial Soviet bureaucracy. They were ready to declaratively approve the new ideology and new, market slogans, but were not prepared for the practical implementation of these slogans [10].

According to M. Khodakovsky, the specificity lies in "the remnants of the old Soviet worldview; national-romantic idea; paternalism; regional particularism; personal interest" [11].

Modernization is almost never accompanied by the stabilization of existing political structures. Weakening of legitimacy, futile search by the authorities for additional social and international support – phenomena typical of the transition period. Ukrainian modernization encounters many obstacles to political paternalism and clientelism on the way not only to an increase in the level of political participation, but also to the development of the system in a broader socio-historical sense.

"Ukraine today resembles a medieval, feudal society in which the political sphere dominates over the economic one, which is based on paternalistic-client relations" [12]. The weakness of the infrastructure of civil society and the lack of channels of self-expression of certain strata of society are compensated by the formation of many elite groups. Instead of developed social pluralism, elite corporatism is being formed at a high rate.

In the context of political modernization, the ideological orientation of the political elite becomes important. With the help of ideology, the political elite develops ideological and value guidelines for their behavior and actions.

The direct influence of the political elite on the object of politics is based on its recognition of certain ideas and attitudes, on the understanding of certain layers of society of their attractiveness, on the authority of the leader. A political leader remains a leader as long as he acts, using his ideological and moral potential to fulfill his status.

The basis for the formation of ideological positions of a political leader are his political interests. Based on them, the choice of political priorities is taken into account, taking into account the interests and needs of different segments of society. Depending on the nature and content of the interests reflected in the ideology, the ideological motivation of a political leader can unite people, but can also divide society according to certain values. Politicians may be interested in both the first and second cases of the effect of ideological motivation.

An important area of ​​action of the new political elite is the development of ideology of modernization, doctrine, which can form an ideological relationship of "uppers" and "bottoms" which will be a source of public consent, activator of public will, the motive for social values, will lead to a kind of "revolution" consciousness ".

The transition from communist ideology to ideological pluralism in Ukraine, as it turned out, takes quite a long time. According to research by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, the ideological preferences of Ukrainian citizens can be divided into four main groups https://123helpme.me/write-my-lab-report/. In 1994, 10.7% of respondents considered themselves supporters of the socialist current, 10.3% of the communist movement, 6.4% of the national democratic movement, and 5.0% of the Social Democratic movement. 17.9% did not define their position, 27.6% do not understand these trends at all. According to the same survey, the least supporters were in liberal ideology (1.9%) [13].

Along with the declaration of the values ​​of freedom and human rights, there was a relentless process of impoverishment of the majority of the population, the growth of property inequality. Non-interference of the state in the economic and social spheres led to the intensification of communist (socialist) ideas. Although the communist ideology is experiencing a deep crisis in Ukraine, it still persists, because it has quite deep social roots, and thus the ideological reserves for recovery.

It is noteworthy that in 2004 the number of supporters of socialism increased to 25.2%, and supporters of capitalism decreased to 11.7% [14]. This can be explained by the fact that economic reforms in Ukraine were carried out by a weak political elite, which "began large-scale liberalization without a balanced program … Reforms were not supported by clear ideas about the principles of creating new democracies" [15 ].

The ideological spectrum of Ukrainian society today is characterized by the transition from a bipolar (communists – anti-communists) and confrontational model of ideological and political reform of society to a multipolar and mostly consensual. And although this transition is not complete (elements of the bipolar model "left – right" and confrontational tendencies are preserved), the contours of the new model of the ideological spectrum are outlined: liberals – communists – nationalists.

The former represent the political ideology of government circles pursuing a market reform of Ukraine. The latter are in extreme opposition to this course, promoting the idea of ​​restoration on a renewed basis of socialist and communist orders. Others declare themselves to be in opposition to both the government’s course and the Communists, advocating reforms with the priority of national interests and the values ​​of the original Ukrainian way of life and way of life.

This to some extent explains why the communist ideology finds supporters among Ukrainians, while the liberal one has attracted only a small part of them, mostly well-off people, as well as intellectuals, for whom the highest value is human freedom of expression.

The division of society into basic values ​​cannot be overcome by decrees and political decisions. The process of abandoning old values ​​and accepting new ones proved to be painful for many, which led to the desire of certain circles to defend socialist values ​​(equality, justice, confidence in the future, etc.). In this situation, there are no real prerequisites for the creation of an integral (unifying) ideology. An attempt to impose a universal ideology on society also requires critical evaluation. In Ukrainian conditions, such an ideology, in whatever democratic formulations it is expressed, will inevitably turn into a state ideology.

Another thing – the national idea and social ideal, which would outline the general direction and purpose of society, determine the values ​​close to the majority of the people. The fact that they are not formulated creates considerable difficulties for politicians, who are often confused in critical situations not only due to lack of competence or lack of experience in public administration, but also because they often do not know where Ukraine is heading. should be offered.

Thus, A. Kolodiy considers the main obstacle to the formation of civil society "is the non-citizenship of the Ukrainian elite, which is manifested primarily in its inability to put the interests of society above private interests and ambitions" [16]. Without a guideline in the form of a national ideal that forms mass values, it is difficult to identify the national interests of the country, "most domestic elites are convinced that the priority of human rights and freedoms in domestic politics is economically unprofitable and politically destructive "[17]. creates difficulties in determining domestic and foreign policy goals and objectives for their implementation.

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